Even more evidence for the emptiness of plurality: An experimental investigation of plural interpretation as a species of implicature by Pearson, Hazel Anne et al.
Proceedings of SALT 20: 489–508, 2010
Even more evidence for the emptiness of plurality: An
experimental investigation of plural interpretation as a species of
implicature∗
Hazel Pearson
Harvard University
Manizeh Khan
Harvard University
Jesse Snedeker
Harvard University
Abstract In two experiments, we test a family of theories that treat the ‘more than
one’ meaning component of the plural morpheme as an implicature rather than an
inherent part of its semantics (Sauerland, Anderssen & Yatsushiro 2005, Spector
2007, Zweig 2009). We find that under certain circumstances, this meaning compo-
nent appears to be canceled, in the manner of an implicature. Our findings suggest
that the implicature is relatively difficult to cancel, and that cancelation is facilitated
by employing a linguistic environment in which plural marking contributes to the
presupposed but not the asserted content. The notion that implicatures may be more
easily canceled when they contribute to the presuppositional component is a novel
contribution of the study.
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1 Introduction
There is a well-known puzzle in the theoretical semantics literature concerning the
distinction between singular and plural in natural language.1 Pre-theoretically, the
plural morpheme seems to mean ‘more than one’, yet sometimes we use plural
morphology without necessarily having in mind a set of more than one object.
Consider the following:
(1) There are no books on Mary’s desk.
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1 For relevant discussion, see Schwarzschild 1996, Chierchia 1998, Sauerland 2003, Sauerland et al.
2005 and Spector 2007.
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(2) If there are books on Mary’s desk, she should lock her door when she leaves.
(3) Are there books on your desk?
If there is exactly one book on Mary’s desk, (1) is false. In the same context,
Mary should lock her door according to (2), and the answer to (3) is ‘yes’. Yet (4) is
false in this context.
(4) There are books on Mary’s desk.
In response to the apparent paradox arising from data like (1-4), a number of
researchers have rejected the notion that the semantics of the plural morpheme in-
corporates a ‘more than one’ condition (henceforth: a multiplicity condition).2 They
propose instead that this meaning component arises as an implicature (Sauerland
2003, Sauerland et al. 2005, Spector 2007, Zweig 2009). In this paper, we report
the findings of an experimental investigation of implicature-based theories of plural
marking, focusing on the theory proposed in Sauerland’s work.
In a recent series of papers, Sauerland suggests that it is part of the meaning of
the singular morpheme that it can only combine with DPs that denote atoms.3 Call
this the atomicity presupposition of the singular; the proposed semantics for singular
morphology is stated in (5a). According to this proposal, there is no corresponding
presupposition associated with plural morphology; that is, the plural morpheme
carries no inherent constraint such that the DP it combines with must denote an
individual of cardinality greater than one (5b).
(5) a. JSGK = λx ∈ De:ATOM(x).x
b. JPLK = λx ∈ De.x
A puzzle remains, of course: if the plural morpheme simply denotes the identity
function on individuals, why can I not utter (4) when there is only one book on
Mary’s desk? That is, why does the plural often mean (or seem to mean) ‘more
than one’? Sauerland’s solution is that the multiplicity condition is derived via an
implicature.
To see this, suppose that the semantics in (5) is correct. That is, the singular
carries an atomicity presupposition, while the plural has no inherent presupposition.
Suppose further that ‘Maximize Presupposition’ holds: given two expressions E1
and E2, whichever carries more presuppositional content is selected, all else being
equal (Heim 1991). Since SG carries a presupposition that has no counterpart in PL,
2 The term ‘multiplicity condition’ is borrowed from Zweig (2009).
3 While Sauerland assumes that number features are realized on a head that takes a DP as its com-
plement, Chierchia (2007) provides arguments that they occupy a lower position. We do not take a
position on this issue, but assume Sauerland’s implementation for expository purposes.
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speakers will use it whenever the constraints on its usage are met: that is, whenever
the DP with which it combines denotes an atom. Use of the plural is therefore
associated with an implicature that the atomicity presupposition is not satisfied –
that is, that the DP denotes an entity consisting of more than one object.
For our purposes, these are the crucial components of Sauerland’s theory. One of
the theory’s virtues is that it provides an explanation for the distribution of readings
exemplified above. On this account, the multiplicity condition is a close relative of
scalar implicature (SI). Like scalar implicatures, it arises as a result of competition
with alternatives that are determined by replacing one item with another item from
the same scale – <PL, SG> in the present case. One might then expect that the
factors determining whether the multiplicity condition is present (as in (4)) or not
(as in (1-3)) will be the same ones that determine whether SIs are present. If so, the
multiplicity condition will have the same distribution as scalar implicatures. Indeed,
it turns out that the environments in which SIs are generally suspended – so-called
downward entailing (DE) contexts – are those in which the multiplicity condition
is absent; the restrictor of ‘no’ (1), the antecedent of a conditional (2) and yes-no
questions (3) exemplify these environments.
On the other hand, scalar implicature is not the only linguistic phenomenon that
exhibits sensitivity to polarity. The distribution of Negative Polarity Items (NPIs)
such as ‘any’ has been convincingly shown to be influenced by entailment properties.
In particular, they are licensed only in DE contexts (Fauconnier 1975, Fauconnier
1979, Ladusaw 1979, Ladusaw 1980,b). A competing hypothesis is therefore that the
distribution of the multiplicity condition is related to the distribution of NPIs rather
than SIs. Consider the details. Suppose that the multiplicity condition is built into
the semantics of plural marking after all. Suppose further that in DE environments
with bare plural nominals, there is an unpronounced ‘any’ that takes the plural noun
phrase as its complement. Conceivably, it is the semantics of this determiner that is
responsible for the apparent absence of the multiplicity condition. It is beyond the
scope of this paper to spell out a semantics for ‘any’ that would produce this result.
The idea is similar to that proposed by Chierchia (1998), who attributes the absence
of the multiplicity condition with plurals in the complement of ‘no’ to the semantics
of ‘no’. By so doing, he is able to maintain the assumption that the semantics of
plural marking incorporates a multiplicity condition, but explain why this condition
is absent when a plural nominal occurs in the complement of ‘no’. We think that
in principle it is possible to extend this idea to bare plurals in DE environments by
blaming the absence of the multiplicity condition on the semantics of ‘any’. If so,
one could explain the distribution of the multiplicity condition without appeal to
implicature. The disappearance of the multiplicity condition in DE environments is
therefore not conclusive evidence that it is an implicature. In our study, we focused
on another property that has been claimed to be a hallmark of scalar implicatures:
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cancelability (Grice 1975). We conducted an experimental study to discern whether
the multiplicity condition can be canceled in upward entailing contexts. If so, this
would constitute additional evidence in favor of an implicature-based theory of plural
marking.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we describe previ-
ous experimental work investigating implicature-based theories of plural marking,
and highlight some of its limitations. In section 3, we report on two experiments
that test whether plural DPs can ever be interpreted as referring to singleton sets
in non-DE contexts. Such a result would suggest that the multiplicity condition
may be subject to cancelation in Grice’s sense. In Experiment 1, we found that
participants were unwilling to interpret plurals as denoting atomic individuals, and
hence that no multiplicity implicature was canceled. In Experiment 2, we found
that adding a presupposition trigger to our stimuli increased tolerance of single-
ton sets as exemplars of plural DPs. Section 4 discusses our findings, which lend
support to implicature-based theories of the plural. The multiplicity implicature
is relatively difficult to cancel, but cancelation is facilitated by including plural
morphology within presupposed rather than asserted material. More generally, our
findings suggest that implicatures are more readily canceled when they are part of
the presupposed content of a sentence, rather than part of the asserted content. This
is a novel result with few precedents in the literature. Section 5 concludes the paper
and points to directions for future research.
2 Previous experimental work
We know of only one published study exploring an implicature-based theory of
plural semantics (Sauerland et al. 2005). The authors reason that the multiplicity
condition should have a similar acquisition profile to scalar implicatures: that is, it
should develop relatively late in child language.4 They investigated this prediction
by employing a truth value judgment task with 14 English-speaking children aged
3;4 to 5;9. On the critical trials, a puppet asked questions of the form ‘Does
a girl have noses?’ or ‘Does a dog have tails?’. The authors reasoned that if
implicature were responsible for the multiplicity condition, it would be absent from
the interpretations assigned to the questions by children, and hence they would
answer ‘yes’. Comparison was with a follow-up study which showed that adults
4 We adopt Sauerland and colleagues’ assumptions in order to explain the logic of the study. However,
recent work casts doubt on their initial premise that young children simply do not compute scalar
implicatures (for review, see Pouscoulous & Noveck in press, Noveck & Reboul 2008). Rather,
their interpretation depends on the particular scalar implicature at hand and the demands of the task
(Barner & Bachrach 2010), and they gradually become more likely to apply the implicature as they
get older.
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overwhelmingly answer ‘no’ to these questions. By contrast, 96% of the child
subjects answered in the affirmative. The authors take these results as suggesting
that the multiplicity condition is acquired relatively late and that, in this respect, it
mirrors the behavior of scalar implicatures.
There are several limitations to this study. First, Sauerland and colleagues
point out that their results may have been affected by the use of yes-no questions –
environments which are arguably downward entailing, and in which the multiplicity
condition appears to disappear, as we have seen above. In response, they point out
that there is controversy over whether these environments are in fact downward
entailing, and argue that the data from adult performance show that a ‘more than
one’ reading is indeed assigned to the plural morpheme in the environments tested
in the experiment. The authors attribute the difference between their stimuli and
yes-no questions such as (3) to a distinction between ‘information seeking questions’
and ‘exam type questions’. The speaker who asks a question of the first type
is presupposed not to know the answer, while the speaker who asks the second
type of question is presupposed to be already aware of the relevant facts. It is
hypothesized that information seeking questions suspend the implicature, while
exam type questions license it. However, it is unclear that this distinction is relevant
to their experiment, as it is explicitly denied that the puppet asking the questions is
well-informed about the answers. The context given in the experiment has it that
the alien is genuinely trying to find out things about life on earth – matters which
he is unaware of. Hence it seems plausible that children are interpreting these as
information seeking questions, rendering the move to impute to children a failure to
calculate a multiplicity implicature unwarranted.5
Second, the difference between the children and adults could reflect limitations
in children’s knowledge of generics rather than non-adult understanding of plurals.
In these stimuli, the singular subject DP receives a kind-oriented interpretation.
Generic sentences with bare plural subjects license dependent plurals: an adult
would answer in the affirmative to questions like ‘Do girls have noses?’, or ‘Do boys
have tongues?’. It is possible that the children had a non-adult understanding of the
licensing conditions on dependent plurals, and interpreted the singular subject of the
stimuli as a licensor. The results of the study would then reflect interpretation of
the direct object as a dependent plural, rather than failure to calculate a multiplicity
implicature.
5 These remarks do not address the question of why adults answered ‘no’ to the critical questions; that
is, why the implicatures are not suspended, unlike with the yes-no question in (3). Spector (2007)
observes that in downward entailing environments, while the plain multiplicity condition is absent,
a flavor of it survives in the form of a modal implicature. For example, ‘Does a girl have noses’
implicates that a girl might in principle have more than one nose. It seems that it is this that adult
subjects were denying in their answers.
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3 Our study
3.1 Experimental set-up
Huang, Snedeker & Spelke (under review) employ a covered box task with 2- and
3- year olds and adults in order to investigate whether upper-bounded readings of
numerals arise via scalar implicature, or are determined by the semantics of the
numeral. There is a striking parallel between this issue and that of the meaning of
plural morphology: in both cases, we are interested in knowing whether a particular
aspect of an item’s meaning is part of its semantics, or rather is pragmatically derived.
The experimental set-up involves three boxes; the contents of two of the boxes are
visible to experimenter and subject, while the third box is covered. In the critical
trials in the Huang et al. paper, instructions are of the form ‘Give me the box with
two cookies’. On display are a box with one cookie, a box with three cookies and a
covered box. If the numeral is typically accompanied by an SI, it is expected to be
canceled given the context because no visible box containing exactly two cookies is
available, and so the subject will select the box with three cookies, thereby satisfying
the experimenter’s request. If, on the other hand, numerals have an exact semantics,
the subject will reject both boxes, conclude that the covered box must be the one that
satisfies the description, and pick it up. Huang and colleagues found that participants
chose the covered box in the critical trials, suggesting that numerals have an exact
semantics. They verified that the covered box task is suitable for testing for the
presence of scalar implicatures by running a follow-up experiment involving the
scalar term ‘some’.
We adopted an analogous procedure to test the cancelability of the multiplicity
condition. Before describing the method in detail, we should discuss a reservation
that one might have about employing the covered box task for this purpose. The
paradigm exploits cancelability as a hallmark of implicatures. However, if the multi-
plicity condition is an implicature, it seems that doubt is cast on the assumption that
all implicatures are cancelable. The continuation in (6) creates a typical cancelation
environment, yet the resulting discourse is infelicitous.
(6) ?? John has books. In fact, he has one.
Chierchia, Fox & Spector (to appear) use data like this to argue that the multi-
plicity implicature is obligatory. If so, it would be no argument against Sauerland’s
theory if the covered box task revealed that participants were unwilling to cancel
it. In reply, we will merely point out that whether this implicature is cancelable or
obligatory is far from being a settled question. For instance, Zweig (2009) develops
an implicature-based account of dependent plurals, and provides examples of these
implicatures being canceled. We therefore think that it is worthwhile to employ
the covered box task paradigm, but the question of whether the experimental set-up
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does an adequate job of facilitating implicature cancelation will take on particular
importance in the case of plurals, a topic to which we will return.
3.2 Experiment 1
3.2.1 Methods
16 native English speakers participated in the experiment. Participants were under-
graduates at Harvard University or members of the local community; they received
study credit for their participation, or were compensated $5.
Following the procedure developed by Huang and colleagues, the study was
divided into a familiarization phase and a test phase, with the familiarization phase
serving the purpose of introducing participants to the task. We departed from the
original paradigm in using cards with pictures on them rather than boxes containing
objects. In the first part of the familiarization phase, three cards were placed on the
table, two face-up and one face-down. Participants were told, ‘I am going to ask you
for one of the cards. Sometimes it will be one of the ones that is face-up, sometimes
it will be the one that is face-down’. Each card depicted Big Bird with some object,
or set of objects, say a kite. Instructions of the form ‘Point to the card where Big
Bird has a kite’ were given. The face-down card was turned over after the participant
made a selection to show that it did indeed conform to the description if the other
two cards did not, and that it did not match the description if one of the visible cards
did. Participants received two trials where there was a visible card satisfying the
description, and two where the face-down card was the correct match. They were
then told, ‘Now we’re not going to check the cards anymore’, and moved on to the
second part of the familiarization phase; this was just like the first part except that
the face-down card was not turned over. One additional participant was excluded
due to incorrectly responding to the final familiarization trial.
During the test phase participants received three trials in one of two conditions,
so that the design was entirely between-subjects, with eight participants assigned
to each condition. The form of the instructions and the visible cards were always
mismatched, resulting in the following conditions:
A. Instruction: Singular. ‘Point to the card where Big Bird has a kite’.
Cards displayed:
(i) Big Bird with more than one kite.
(ii) Big Bird with nothing.
(iii) Face down card.
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B. Instruction: Plural. ‘Point to the card where Big Bird has kites’.
Cards displayed:
(i) Big Bird with one kite.
(ii) Big Bird with nothing.
(iii) Face down card.
In a pilot study, we found that when there was a card showing the appropriate
number of the mentioned item, participants always chose it rather than a card with a
mismatched number of items. We were therefore confident that if participants chose
a number mismatched card, it was not because number marking was insufficiently
salient. Like Huang and colleagues we used a between-subjects design to avoid
highlighting the contrast between singular and plural sets, since this might encourage
participants to treat them contrastively and make them aware of the purpose of the
study. As in the second part of the familiarization phase, in the test phase participants
did not turn over the face-down card after making their choice.
3.2.2 Predictions
If Sauerland is right that the multiplicity condition is an implicature, and supposing
the experimental set-up was successful in facilitating cancelation of this implicature,
then we would expect that in the plural condition, participants should select the
visible card showing only one of the mentioned object, rather than choosing the face-
down card. Moreover, cancelation should not be possible in the singular condition,
since the atomicity requirement is built into the semantics of the singular.
3.2.3 Results
Participants overwhelmingly chose the face-down card in this experiment, insisting
on an ‘exactly one’ interpretation for singulars and a ‘more than one’ interpretation
for plurals. On average, participants chose the face-down card on 96% of trials,
in both the singular and plural conditions. There was no significant, or numerical,
difference between the singular and plural conditions in tendency to choose the
face-down card across the three critical trials (Mann-Whitney U=32.0, p=1.000).
3.2.4 Discussion
Participants chose the face-down card rather than violate the numerical inferences
associated with the singular and the plural. Here are two possible interpretations of
our results. One possibility is that the implicature-based theory of plural marking
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is wrong, and participants failed to cancel an implicature in the critical conditions
because there was no implicature there to cancel. On the other hand, it is possible that
something about the experimental set-up or the form of the stimuli was insufficient to
cause the implicature to be canceled.6 This would be consistent with the observation
that if the multiplicity condition is generated via implicature, the resulting implicature
is more difficult to cancel than, say, that associated with the scalar quantifier ‘some’.
Experiment 2 explores this second possibility.
3.3 Experiment 2
3.3.1 Methods
32 students from Harvard University and members of the local community partic-
ipated. Again, participants received either course credit or $5. The experimental
set-up was the same as in Experiment 1, the sole change being the introduction of
the word ‘only’ to the instructions on all trials, including familiarization. Thus, the
critical trials had instructions of the form ‘Point to the card where Big Bird only
has kites/a kite’, with the visual conditions as in Experiment 1. Neutral intonation
was used, with the experimenter avoiding using focal stress on any particular lexical
items.
We speculated that the addition of ‘only’ to our stimuli may create a linguistic
context that would facilitate implicature cancelation for the plural. Firstly, we
thought that ‘only’ might encourage the listener to look for a smaller set of items,
so that if a single kite is compatible with the semantics of ‘kites’, then it would be
even more acceptable as a small set of ‘kites’. Secondly, we noted that ‘only’ is a
presupposition trigger (Horn 1969), and speculated that the multiplicity implicature
may not be obligatory when it occurs within presupposed material. In order to
explore this idea, let’s take a short excursion into the semantics of ‘only’.
We shall assume a fairly traditional semantics for ‘only’, following Horn (1969)
and Rooth (1985, 1992).7 Consider a sentence of form ‘Only S’, where S is a variable
over sentences. Call S the prejacent; ‘Only S’ presupposes its prejacent (Horn 1969).
Some constituent of S associates with focus, determining a set of alternatives to S,
6 Pilot work with a different set of familiarization cards supports the notion that the experimental
set-up affects the probability of implicature cancelation. When the familiarization cards did not
demonstrate the possibility that Big Bird can have the same type of thing on more than one card,
participants universally accepted the visible card even when it conflicted with the number marking in
the description.
7 The semantics of ‘only’ is of course a much more controversial topic than our discussion will suggest.
Alternatives to Horn’s (1969) analysis have been proposed by Atlas (1993), Horn (1996), van Rooij
(2005), and Ippolito (2007), among others.
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called ALT(S). The semantics for ‘Only S’ is stated in (7).
(7) a. JOnly SK is defined only if JSK= 1
b. When defined, JOnly SK= 1 iff ∀S′[(S′ ∈ALT(S)∧JS′K 6⊆ JSK)→ JS′K=
0]
Consider our test sentence ‘Point to the card where [Big Bird only has kites]’.
Let’s assume that the LF of the bracketed constituent is as in (8).8
(8) Only [Big Bird has [DP kites]F ].
The presupposition of (8) is that Big Bird has kites, while it asserts that he has
nothing that is not a kite. An interesting consequence of this analysis is that the
multiplicity condition is only relevant to the presupposed content of the sentence,
and not its truth conditions. While we have already seen linguistic data suggesting
that the multiplicity implicature is obligatory when it contributes to what is asserted,
there seems no a priori reason to think that it is obligatory when it contributes to
what is presupposed but not what is asserted, as was the case with our stimuli in the
plural condition in this experiment.
For our purposes, ‘only’ held two advantages over other presupposition trig-
gers. Firstly, since its prejacent is presupposed but not asserted, plural marking
contributed to the presupposed but not the asserted component, unlike with factive
verbs, for example.9 Secondly, using ‘only’ allowed us to avoid the problem that an
implicature-canceling context might also cancel an unrelated implicature attached
to the use of the singular. To see how this implicature would work, consider the
sentences in (9).
(9) a. Big Bird has a kite.
b. Big Bird has more than one kite.
(9b) asymmetrically entails (9a). By the familiar reasoning process associated
with the (Gricean) derivation of scalar implicatures, it is therefore expected that (9a)
implicates that (9b) is false.10 However, if this implicature was canceled as well
as any putative implicature on the plural, the results would be indiscernible from a
strategy of simply ignoring number marking in favor of choosing a card showing the
8 Subscript ‘F’ indicates focus marking.
9 That the interpretation of plural morphology is not relevant to the asserted component is crucial:
without this proviso, one might object that number marking also contributed to the presupposition in
the stimuli used in Experiment 1, given that they involved definite descriptions.
10 This is a simplification. It is not the case that implicatures that can be expressed as the negation of a
more informative alternative are freely generated; assuming this gives rise to well-known difficulties
such as the so-called ‘symmetry problem’ discussed in Chierchia et al. to appear. We set this issue
aside for the present purposes.
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mentioned object. This is controlled for in Experiment 2, since ‘Big Bird only has a
kite’ entails, rather than implicates, the falsity of (9b).11
3.3.2 Results
A clear difference between the singular and plural conditions emerged in this exper-
iment. On average, participants in the singular condition chose the face-down card
on 96% of trials, whereas those in the plural condition chose the face-down card
on 35% of trials (U = 43.5, p< .001). In other words, when given the description
‘only has a kite’, participants almost always rejected an option that showed multiple
kites, whereas the description ‘only has kites’ frequently led to accepting an option
with a single kite. Moreover, when we compare these results to Experiment 1,
we find no significant differences between the two singular conditions (all trials:
U = 68.0, p = .609; first trial: χ = .522, p = .470), but do find a significant de-
crease in the tendency to choose the face-down card, and accept the numerically
mismatched visible card, in the plural condition (all trials: U = 23.5, p< .01; first
trial: χ = 5.371, p< .05).
3.3.3 Discussion
The only change from Experiment 1 to 2 was the addition of ‘only’ to the descrip-
tions, and yet here participants were willing to accept the number mismatched card.
Recall that in the sentences used in our plural conditions, the interpretation of the
plural morpheme is relevant to the presuppositional but not the asserted component.
We claim that it is this property of our stimuli which encouraged participants in
the plural condition in Experiment 2 to cancel the ‘more than one’ implicature.
Sauerland’s theory predicts that there should be both a strengthened presupposition
for (10), ‘Big Bird has more than one kite’, and a weaker one with no implicature,
‘Big Bird has at least one kite’.
(10) Big Bird only has kites.
Our results suggest that two thirds of the time, a card satisfying the asserted
component and the weaker presupposition was considered an adequate match. We
have seen that the implicature of the plural is difficult to cancel when it is part of
the asserted content of a sentence; however it need not follow that it is equally
difficult to cancel in the presuppositional component. Precedents to the idea that
11 This entailment arises on the assumption that the DP ‘a kite’ is focus-marked, and not just the noun
by itself. While we could not know in advance that this is how participants in the singular condition
would interpret the stimuli, the results reported in section 3.3.2 suggest that this is indeed what
happened.
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implicatures within presupposed material are less robust than those involved in the
at-issue content exist in the literature. Russell (2006) notes that (11) is equally
felicitous regardless of whether it is presupposed that some of George’s advisors are
crooks, or all are.
(11) George knows that some of his advisors are crooks. (Russell 2006: 362)
If Russell is right that (11) is felicitous in a context in which it is taken for granted
that all of George’s advisors are crooks, this would sit well with our finding that
participants seemed to interpret the stimuli as carrying the weaker presupposition two
thirds of the time.12 To this observation we would add that the felicity of the discourse
in (12) supports the idea that when an implicature carried by a plural morpheme
contributes to what is presupposed, it is relatively easy to cancel. Assuming that
‘know’ and ‘realize’ presuppose their complements, the second conjunct of (12)
would be expected to create an empty context set if the plural had a strong semantics,
or carried an obligatory implicature within presuppositional material.
(12) John knows that Mary has children, but he doesn’t realize that she actually
only has one.
We close this section by considering the possibility that selection of the mis-
matching card in the plural condition was not a consequence of implicature can-
celation, but reflected a general strategy of ignoring presupposed content in favor
of selecting a card satisfying the asserted content. Here is where our card showing
Big Bird with no object comes into play. Observe that this card does not satisfy the
presuppositions of our stimuli in either the singular or plural conditions, but neither
does it contradict the asserted content. If the strategy described was at work, we
should expect participants to choose the distractor card instead of the face-down one
in the singular condition, but none of them did. We conclude that those participants
who tolerated single exemplars in the plural condition were not simply sacrificing
the presupposition for the sake of finding a match for the asserted component; rather
they chose the card that satisfied the weak presupposition of the sentence.
One alternative interpretation that we cannot presently rule out, however, is that
participants were sensitive to pragmatic constraints on the felicitous use of ‘only’.
In the singular condition, these constraints were satisfied, as the visible card with
multiple kites could serve as a contrast to only having ‘a kite’; however in the plural
condition there was no plausible contrast item visible, so participants might have
assumed that the contrast item was the face-down card, making them less likely to
choose this card as the referent of the target sentence.
12 Russell uses this example for a different purpose from us. His view is that there is no scalar implicature
in (11), and that the appearance of there being one arises from a contextual assumption about how
well-informed the attitude-holder is.
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4 General discussion
Let’s take stock. We have two different results, gleaned by employing the covered
box task with subtle variation in the wording of the test sentences. In Experiment 1,
we found that participants rejected a single item as a possible referent for a plural
DP, and rejected a set of multiple items as a possible referent for a singular DP. In
Experiment 2, where the wording was altered so that participants now heard ‘only
has kites/a kite’, participants became more tolerant of the single kite in the plural
condition, but performance in the singular condition was unchanged.
One thing we can say with confidence is that if there is an implicature associated
with the plural morpheme, it is difficult to cancel; this is demonstrated in Experiment
1, where participants consistently chose the face-down card. In Experiment 1,
nothing more was done to encourage cancelation than to create a context in which
there was a choice between a visible card compatible with the description providing
that the implicature is canceled, and a face-down card. Huang and colleagues’
work shows that with the scalar term ‘some’ this set-up is sufficient to facilitate
cancelation; it is not sufficient to do so with the implicature associated with the
plural – if indeed it is an implicature. We have already acknowledged on the basis of
linguistic intuitions that an implicature-based theory of the plural would have to treat
this implicature as less susceptible to cancelation than more familiar implicatures.
Hence the results of Experiment 1 are not sufficient to discredit Sauerland’s theory.
Our interpretation of the results in Experiments 2 is as follows. The difficulty
of canceling the implicature associated with the plural is ameliorated by setting
up a linguistic environment in which the meaning of plural marking contributes
to the presupposed content of the stimuli, rather than what is asserted. If so, our
findings have important consequences for our understanding of the interaction of
implicature and presupposition, which may in turn bear on the question whether
certain implicatures are computed by grammar or pragmatics.
In the remainder of this section, we consider three alternative interpretations of
the results of Experiment 2. We shall reject the first two of these, but acknowledge
that the third is compatible with our data.
First attempt: genericity One way of interpreting the data is to say that partici-
pants interpreted ‘. . . Big Bird only has kites’ as involving quantification over kinds.
A paraphrase would be, ‘Big Bird has something belonging to the kite-kind, and for
no other kind of item does Big Bird have something belonging to that kind’. Given
our statement of the truth conditions of ‘Big Bird only has kites’, this analysis is
tempting: the truth conditions are calculated with reference to alternatives that are
formed by replacing the type of thing named in the prejacent with some other type
of object. We do not think this is the right interpretation of our data, however.
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For one thing, the alienable possession relation denoted by ‘have’ in our stimuli
is stage-level. Suppose we grant that bare plurals are kind-denoting (Carlson 1977),
as is presumably necessary to implement the idea we are entertaining. Nonethe-
less, the semantics for our stimuli would have to make reference to realizations of
the kind rather than the kind itself, given standard assumptions about stage-level
predication.13 Let us say that a realization of a kind k is an individual of cardinality
1 or more that intuitively belongs to k. Hence a single dog is a realization of the
dog-kind, as is any group of more than one dog. The problem is that as soon as one
resorts to predicating things of realizations of a kind, one is again faced with the
problem of number. This can be seen by examining the following example, where
the stage-level predicate ‘be barking’ combines with the bare plural ‘dogs’. Stating
the truth conditions of (13) involves existential quantification over realizations of the
dog-kind, as shown in (14).
(13) Dogs are barking.
(14) ∃x [R(x,d) & barking(x)] (where R(a,b) iff a is a realization of b)
(14) is clearly not quite strong enough to capture the intuitive meaning of (13).
Since a single dog is a realization of the dog-kind, (14) could be true in a context
where only one dog is barking. What is needed is the proviso that there be an
individual of cardinality greater than one with the properties of realizing the dog-
kind and barking. Otherwise, the import of plural morphology in (13) is not captured
by the semantics.
These comments are intended to show that making reference to kinds does not
neutralize the effects of number marking: wherever we find stage-level predication,
we must make room for a contribution from number marking to the truth conditions
of the sentence. Now, recall that ‘Big Bird only has kites’ presupposes that Big Bird
has kites. A logical form for the presupposition can be stated by analogy with (14).14
(15) ∃x [R(x,k) & be-had-by-Big-Bird(x)]
We are in just the same position as we encountered with (14). The truth conditions
are too weak to capture the import of number marking. To frame the issue slightly
differently, given that we have learned that treating bare plurals as kind-denoting
does not solve the problem of number marking because it rears its head again when
one considers stage-level predication, treating the results of Experiment 2 in terms of
genericity will not help, since the stimuli involve a stage-level relation. If one were to
13 The notion ‘realization of a kind’ and its involvement in the analysis of stage-level predications were
first discussed in Carlson 1977.
14 We assume for expository purposes that Quantifier Raising of a covert existential operator enables a
one-place predicate [λx.Big Bird has x] to be formed.
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take this approach, one would be left with the question why the strengthening of the
truth conditions in (14) that we have said is necessary is apparently unnecessary for
(15). We won’t pursue this account further, but will instead turn to two other possible
explanations of the results of Experiment 2, both of which appeal to implicature.
Second attempt: downward entailment Von Fintel (1999) observes that in some
cases, the addition of ‘only’ creates an environment in which Negative Polarity Items
(NPIs) are licit, as demonstrated in (16).
(16) a. *John has any books on his desk.
b. Only John has any books on his desk.
Facts like (16) pose something of a puzzle for the traditional theory of NPI
licensing, since the structure in which ‘any’ is licensed in (16b) is not classically
downward entailing, as can be verified by observing that (17a) does not entail (17b).
(17) a. Only John has books on his desk.
b. Only John has books about linguistics on his desk.
Von Fintel responds by introducing a notion of ‘Strawson downward entailment’;
his definition is repeated below.
(18) Strawson Downward Entailingness
A function f of type <σ ,τ> is Strawson-DE iff for all x,y of type σ such that
x⇒ y, and f(x) is defined, f(y)⇒ f(x). (von Fintel 1999: 104)
A function-argument term a(b) is defined only if its presuppositions are satisfied.
Hence we can check whether (17a) Strawson-entails (17b) by checking that if (17b)
is defined (if its presuppositions are satisfied), then (17a) entails (17b). We have said
that sentences of form ‘Only S’ presuppose that S. So the question is whether, in a
context in which John has books about linguistics on his desk, it cannot be true that
only John has books on his desk without it being the case that only John has books
about linguistics on his desk. Indeed it cannot; hence (17a) Strawson downward
entails (17b). Von Fintel concludes that a Strawson-DE environment can license
NPIs, and that this is what explains data like (16).
The idea that scalar implicatures are suspended in the contexts in which NPIs are
licensed is by now fairly current in the literature (Chierchia 2004). One might expect
on the basis of the discussion above that sentences employing ‘only’ also set up an
environment in which SIs are suspended. The data in Experiment 2 would then be
explained by saying that plural morphology is associated with an implicature which
was suspended in the linguistic environment in which it occurred in our stimuli. This
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is a tempting thought, but we do not think it is right. Firstly, adding ‘any’ to our
stimuli produces an ungrammatical result.
(19) *Big Bird only has any kites.
This is unsurprising when one considers that the direct object position of this
sentence is not Strawson-DE: in a context in which Big Bird has red kites, the
inference from (20a) to (20b) is unwarranted.
(20) a. Big Bird only has kites.
b. Big Bird only has red kites.
One explanation for the failure of our stimuli to create a Strawson-DE environ-
ment might be that (20a) communicates the same information as (21a). The failure
of the inference from (20a) to (20b) is therefore on a par with the failure of the
inference from (21a) to (21b) in a context in which Big Bird has red kites.
(21) a. All Big Bird has are kites.
b. All Big Bird has are red kites.
Since the right-hand argument of a universal is upward entailing, it would indeed
be surprising if it turned out to be Strawson-Downward Entailing, which notion
is after all a more permissive variety of classical downward entailment. There is
certainly more to say about these issues; we close this section by simply saying
that the idea that a form of downward entailment played a role in suspending an
implicature in the sentences used in Experiment 2 cannot be right.
Third attempt: the scope of a universal Sauerland et al. (2005) and Spector
(2007) provide examples involving plural morphology in the scope of a universal
quantifier where the multiplicity condition is absent, or at least does not seem to
project universally. Consider for example the following:
(22) Yesterday, every student solved difficult problems. (Spector 2007: 259)
Spector reports that this sentence is not considered false in a context where every
student solved at least one difficult problem, and a proper subset of them solved
more than one difficult problem.15 We observed in the previous section that the
communicative content of our stimuli in the plural condition of Experiment 2 can
be thought of as a universally quantified sentence that can be paraphrased as ‘All
Big Bird has are kites’, in which case plural morphology contributes to the scope of
the universal quantifier. One might wonder whether whatever is responsible for the
15 On the relevant reading, the universal has wide scope with respect to the direct object.
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judgment in (22) is also responsible for the results of Experiment 2. We cannot do
justice here to Spector’s proposal concerning the interpretation of plural marking in
the scope of a universal. We would point out, however, that underlying this alternative
interpretation of our results is the intuition that ‘only’ is like ‘every’ except that it
denotes the superset relation rather than the subset relation; it is this that gives rise to
the equivalence of our stimuli with a universally quantified sentence in which plural
marking appears in the scope rather than the restrictor. Pushing the analogy between
‘only’ and ‘every’ too far would have unwelcome consequences: it would imply
that ‘only’ is a non-conservative determiner, and it would fail to do justice to the
syntactic evidence that ‘only’ is not a determiner. However, we acknowledge that
this interpretation of the results of Experiment 2 cannot be ruled out solely on the
basis of the series of experiments described here. In future experiments, we plan to
employ a broader range of presupposition triggers in order to discriminate between
our proposal and the alternative just described.
5 Conclusion
Our study supports a theory of the meaning of plural morphology whereby the plural
morpheme is associated with a multiplicity condition by means of implicature, as
has been argued by Uli Sauerland and others. While the results of Experiment
1 are compatible with such a theory, the most compelling evidence in favor of it
comes from Experiment 2: for a significant proportion of subjects, the implicature
associated with the presupposed content in our stimuli was canceled. Our data also
suggest that presuppositional environments facilitate implicature cancelation – a
view which we have argued is the correct interpretation of Experiment 2. Future
work will address these questions with a wider variety of presupposition triggers and
controls, and with a much larger sample size.
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